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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SEARCHES
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST LIMITED
TO THE AREA WITHIN REACH OF THE
ARRESTEE
p recipitating the revival of the long neglected search warrant,, the
Supreme Court in Chimel v. California held unlawful a
warrantless search conducted incidental to the valid arrest of a coin
store burglar, thereby expressly overruling the leading cases of
Harris v. United States and United States v. Rabinowitz.' Acting
on information provided by a neighbor, three area police officers
arrived at Ted Steven Chimel's home with an arrest warrant but
without a search warrant. With the permission of Chimel's wife,
they waited for him to return from work and upon his arrival
effected the arrest. Although the arrest warrant was later
determined to be insufficient,5 the arrest was held to be justified on
the grounds that adequate probable cause was present. 6
Notwithstanding Chimel's refusal to consent to a search of the
house, the officers conducted a forty-five to sixty minute search
throughout the entire three-room house on the theory that the
search was incidental to a valid arrest. The search included the
attic, garage and workshop, and purusant to the officer's
directions, Chimel's wife moved articles in drawers to provide an
unrestricted view of the contents. The officers seized coins, medals,
and tokens which had presumably been taken in the burglary.
Chimel attempted unsuccessfully to have these articles excluded at
his trial on the grounds that the search was unconstitutional.7
'In 1963, these areas issued the following total number of search warrants:
Detroit 68
Milwaukee 39
New York City 5132
District Courts
Eastern District Michigan 174
Eastern District Wisconsin 16
Southern District Kansas 20
L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROSENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 100-04 (1967).
2395 U.S. 752 (1969).
3331 U.S. 145 (1947).
4 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
5 People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 440, 439 P.2d 333, 335, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421, 423 (1968).
6 68 Cal. 2d at 442, 439 P.2d at 337, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
'395 U.S. at 753-54, 774 n.4.
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Because the fourth amendment was enacted in reaction to
general warrants and searches during the colonial, period,
warrantless searches have never been favored8 However, 'the Court
has allowed warrantless searches incidental to a valid arrest on the
basis of a need to safeguard arresting officers or to prevent the
destruction of evidence.' Such searches were ostensibly limited to
the area within the arrestee's control,"0 but the application of this
ambiguous concept caused confusion and led the Court to adopt
varied standards." First interpreted as including "the place of
arrest,' 2 control was found toexist over a living-room and was
later expanded to include "all parts of the premises used for an
unlawful purpose.' '13 The latter interpretation provided the basis for
admitting a ledger found in a closet while officers with a search
warrant were seeking intoxicating liquors. 4 Subsequently the Court
evinced disapproval of this latitude and demanded search warrants
if the police desired to extend searches of offices into safes and
drawers, as occurred in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States
5
and United States v. Lejkowitz.11 Finally, in Trupiano v. United
States, 7 the practicality of obtaining a warrant was made the
leading factor in determining the reasonableness of a search.
However, Harris departed from the rationale of these latter cases
by approving a four-room search, the widest thus far condoned, and
distinguished prior searches by indicating that in Harris the officers
were not making an exploratory foray as in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz
but rather were searching only for specific items.' Placing
IId. at 761; see, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56. 69
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56
(1948); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390, 392 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).
' See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
11 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
11 Compare United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) with Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
2 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 (1925).
" Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
"Id. at 193.
I 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
"285 U.S. 452 (1932).
" 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
"1331 U.S. at 153.
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emphasis on the fact that the evidence could hardly be ignored once
it was found, the Court considered fortuitous the fact that the
evidence that convicted Harris was not included in the warrant but
was found during the search, as in Marron v. United States."0
Rabinowitz completed the liberalization begun by Harris by stating
that the appropriate test was "not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was
reasonable. ' 20 Thus by substituting the "totality of the
circumstances," '21 Trupiano's emphasis on the practicality of
obtaining a warrant was removed from the determination of
reasonableness.
An opposing line of authority that Chimel has now adopted was
presaged by the dissents of Justice Jackson in Harris and Justice
Frankfurter in Rabinowitz. Justice Jackson was opposed to
allowing any search beyond the person of the arrestee, for to permit
a wider latitude would lead to arbitrary distinctions and make any
delineations impossible for the police.22 Frankfurter's dissent in
Rabinowitz adopted a modification of this extreme view by
allowing whatever was on the person and within his immediate
control to be subject to search. Although the majority also used
the term "immediate control,' '24 Frankfurter defined the term as
including only what was in close physical proximity to the arrestee,
not an area to which the person had an exclusive right. These
dissenting views have been noticeably favored in recent Supreme
Court decisions, with a consequent disregard for the majority
holdings in Harris and Rabinowitz.25 Although doubting whether
the Court in this decade would have decided Rabinowitz in the
same manner,26 the lower federal courts have necessarily decided
cases under its aegis, creating the possibility in several that
opposite decisions would have been reached if Chimel had been the
11275 U.S. 192 (1927).
339 U.S. at 66.
22 Id. at 63, 66. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
2331 U.S. at 197.
339 U.S. at 83.
Id. at 61, 64 (majority opinion).
21See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 265 F. Supp. 15, 25 (W.D. Tex. 1967); United States v.
Williams, 219 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd 336 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 857 (1964). But see Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1968).
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law. 27 Recent decisions of the Court in the related fourth
amendment areas of "frisks" and eavesdropping had been used by
some commentators 8 as a basis for suggesting that Chimel was not
only desirable, but inevitable. Katz v. United States2' went the
farthest in demanding warrants, stating that searches without
warrants were "per se unreasonable, '30 while Terry v. Ohio'l held
that only a limited external search of the person, motivated by
reason to believe that the suspect is armed, is permissible.
After tracing the erratic "swings of the pendulum" in the field
of warrantless searches, the Chimel Court proceeded to explain why
the swing that produced Harris and Rabinowitz had been improper
in the light of "historical" and "rational" analysis3 Rabinowitz
had not followed the precedent of its immediate forebears, Go-
Bart, Lefkowitz and Trupiano, and had exaggerated the scope
allowed in the cases it supposedly followed. More importantly, the
Court observed that the limitless searches incident to an arrest
allowed by Rabinowitz resembled the general searches which the
fourth amendment was designed to destroy 3 The Court/indicated
that the older cases in the field qualified the right to search without
a warrant by establishing standards which denominated the search
legal if it met the requirements for a warrant. Additionally, the
court indicated that cases such as Terry v. Ohio,34 Preston v.
United States3 and Warden v. Hayden' all held that warrants
should be obtained before a search is conducted and had severely
limited the scope of permissible warrantless searches. Furthermore,
the scrutiny of "rational" analysis gave no greater support than
history to the test of Harris and Rabinowitz. Although Justice
2See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 265 F. Supp. 15, 26 (W.D. Tex. 1967); United States v.
Williams, 219 F. Supp. 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd, 336 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 857 (1964).
2See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 117, 121 (1967);
Comment, Search & Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28
U. CHi. L. REV. 664 (1961); Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78
YALE L.J. 433 (1969).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'Id. at 357.
31392 U.S. 1 (1968).
"395 U.S. at 760.
3See 339 U.S. at 69-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); note 8 supra and accompanying text..
"392 U.S. 1 (1968). See text accompanying note 31 supra.
-376 U.S. 364 (1964).
- 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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White, in dissent, urged that the police here had independent
probable cause sufficient for the search without having to rely upon
the arrest for justification, the majority dismissed this contention
on the basis that this was all the more reason for the police to have
procured a warrant before the arrest was made. The Court also
dismissed, as irrational, previous attempts to distinguish reasonable
and unreasonable searches on such grounds as the number of
rooms searched, or whether the arrest occurred inside or outside a
house. The fears which prompted adoption of the fourth
amendment and were expressed in Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Rabinowitz 37 were found to have been substantiated in past cases
where searches have been conducted on trivial excuses.18 These fears
are realized where the police purposely wait for a suspect to enter
an area they desire to investigate before effecting an arrest."
Although the Court did not expressly find this to have been true in
Chimel, the possibility that this strategem was used is raised and
offered as a further basis for overruling the Harris-Rabinowitz
standard of reasonableness. Applying "sound Fourth Amendment
principles" 4 0 the Court held that the search was unreasonable
because it extended beyond the area now defined as immediate
control-the extent of the arrestee's reach.
In addition to re-establishing the search warrant as a major
aspect of criminal procedure, Chimel provides a realistic guideline
for the police. Previously a search was evaluated on its
"reasonableness" as seen in the total context of the case. This
nebulous concept gave the police no assistance since they
interpreted Rabinowitz as allowing a thorough examination of
virtually the entire premises.4' In general the courts acquiesced" and
admitted the fruits of questionable searches because of the
impossibility of determining "reasonableness." Therefore it was
held that if the person had a legal right to the premises, be it an
339 U.S. at 80-82. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"sSee, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Lofton v. Warden, 83 Nev. 356,
431 P.2d 981 (1967). See also United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir.
1926).
31 E.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); McKnight v. United States, 183
F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
4* 395 U.S. at 768.
4 See, e.g., People v. Braden, 34 Ill. 2d 516, 216 N.E.2d 808 (1966); State v. Miller, 47
N.J. 273, 220 A.2d 409 (1966).
42 See cases cited note 41 supra.
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office or a boarding-room,43 and if he were present at the time of
arrest, the area was in his immediate control.44 Chimel, by
definitely stating that immediate control includes only that area in
which the arrestee might have been able to gain access to a weapon
or destructible evidence,4"5 broadens the chances for future exclusions
due to an overwide search. Justice White argued that in addition to
the limited emergencies recognized by the Court in which a warrant
would be unnecessary,4  the arrest itself created an emergency
situation in which evidence could have been destroyed before the
return of the officers, but the majority placed emphasis upon the
fact that the officers possessed an arrest warrant and therefore
could have procured a search warrant at the same time. There
are ways to prevent the destruction that Justice White en-
visioned, in stituations where officers find it necessary to return to
the magistrate, such as sealing the room, placing the other
occupants under police surveillance, or even removing them. It does
not seem unduly burdensome to require a police officer to apply for
a search warrant at the same time he procures an arrest warrant.
This encourages the constitutional preference for objective
intervention by a magistrate to determine the reasonableness of the
search. If the magistrate, in issuing a search warrant, requires more
than a finding of probable cause to arrest, and if the search warrant
is not automatically issued in conjunction with a warrant for arrest,
Chimel will contribute to the prevention of unsanctioned invasions
of privacy and reduce the necessity of resorting to the exclusionary
rule.
Further, although Chimel may increase dependence upon
consent searches, the decision will likely increase the importance of
recent cases dealing with requirements for a valid warrant,47 which
11 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Haas v. United States, 344
F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1965).
11 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Cole, 365 F.2d
57 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1027 (1967); Haas v. United States, 344 F.2d 56
(8th Cir. 1955).
'1 395 U.S. at 763. For a recent application of this test, see People v. Cressy, 275 Cal. App.
2d 603, 80 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969), where a gun and an envelope of marijuana on a table 10 to 15
feet from defendant were held to be in his control.
"See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 n.19 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102 (1965); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
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have previously had only a limited impact due to the reliance of the
police on search incident to arrest. Chimel, although probably
destined to be the object of criticism by those feeling that another
heavy burden has been added to policework,48 places the search
incident to arrest in its proper perspective as a limited emergency
protective measure rather than an excuse for full-scale explorations
which would otherwise be prohibited by the fourth amendment.
To date, Chirnel has been applied prospectively only. See People v. Groves, 458 P.2d 985,
80 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1969); People v. Edwards, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); People
v. Superior Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 42, 47 (Ct. App. 1969); People v. Chambers, 80 Cal. Rptr. 672
(Ct. App. 1969); People v. Castillo, 80 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Ct. App. 1969); People v. Cressy, 80
Cal. Rptr. 65 (Ct. App. 1969); People v. Foster, 79 Cal. Rptr. 397 (Ct. App. 1969); Scott v.
State, 256 A.2d 384 (Md. App. 1969); cf Colosimo v. Perini, No. 18832 (6th Cir., Sept. 17,
1969).
